The Chicago Plan and New Deal Banking Reform
The Chicago Plan and New Deal Banking Reform presents a comprehensive history and evaluation of the role of the 100% reserve plan in the banking legislation of the New Deal reform era—from its inception in 1933 to its re-emergence in the current financial reform debate in the US.
Table of Contents
Introduction: The Quest for Stable Banking
Chapter 1: A History of Currency and Banking in the United States
Chapter 2: Response to the Banking Crisis: Hoover, Congress, and the Economists
Chapter 3: Roosevelt's Election and the Banking Crisis of 1933
Chapter 4: The March 1933 Chicago Memorandum
Chapter 5: The 100 Days Legislation and the Banking Act of 1933
Chapter 6: The November Chicago Memorandum
Chapter 7: The Banking Reform Agenda: A Federal Monetary Authority and Credit Allocation
Chapter 8: Currie, Eccles, and the Ideal Conditions for Monetary Control
Chapter 10: The Banking Act of 1935
Chapter 11: Academic Views of the Chicago Plan
Chapter 12: The Chicago Plan after the Passage of the Banking Act of 1935
Chapter 13: Financial Instability and Narrow Banking: Simmons Revisited
Chapter 14: Conclusion