Publications

Bail-ins and Bank Resolution in Europe

Type
Link
Cost
Paid
Published
2017
Full Name
Bail-ins and Bank Resolution in Europe: A Progress Report

Bail-ins and Bank Resolution in Europe reviews provides a critical comparison of the US and EU bank resolution rules, including the underlying similarities, differences, and enhancement points of both frameworks. It then goes on to focus on European banking failures, providing estimates of taxpayer costs and considering the hypothetical application of stronger private sector bail-in consistent with the spirit of the Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive. The report ends with a number of policy recommendations concerning governance, stress testing, cross-border issues, and resolution of financial contracts.

  • This book is the 4th Special Report in the Geneva Reports on the World Economy series that reviews the current status of bail-ins and bank resolutions in Europe.

  • Drawing together the expertise of its Research Fellows and Affiliates, CEPR initiates, funds and coordinates Research activities and communicates the results quickly and effectively to decision makers around the world.



Table of Contents

Executive Summary

Introduction

Literature Review

Part 1: Overview of the US and EU frameworks

  • US Resolution Framework

  • EU Resolution Framework

  • Comparison and Discussion

Part 2: Evidence and Case Studies

  • Some Evidence on the Impact of 'Living Wills'

  • Case Studies of Some European Banks

  • Overview of Banks Considered

  • Summary of the Case Studies

  • Cyprus: Bain-in and Capital Controls

  • Italian Retail Exposure to Bail-In

Part 3: Challenges and Recommendations

  • Establishing Credibility: Common Good, Private Cost

  • The Need to Monitor Who Holds Bail-Inable Instruments

  • Design of Stress Tests

  • Harmonisation and Predictability of Insolvency and Collateral Security Laws

  • Timing and Coordination

  • Living Wills and Liquidity

  • Cross-Border Resolution and the Choice Between SPE and MPE

  • Derivatives, Short-Term Liabilities and Safe Harbour

  • Reduced Discretion of the Bail-In Rules

  • Creation of a Privilege of New Money

Conclusion

References